On the Face of It?  Establishing Jurisdiction on Claims to Compel Arbitration Under Section 4 of the FAA by Moloff, Leda
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 77 Issue 1 Article 4 
2008 
On the Face of It? Establishing Jurisdiction on Claims to Compel 
Arbitration Under Section 4 of the FAA 
Leda Moloff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leda Moloff, On the Face of It? Establishing Jurisdiction on Claims to Compel Arbitration Under Section 4 
of the FAA, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 181 (2008). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
On the Face of It? Establishing Jurisdiction on Claims to Compel Arbitration 
Under Section 4 of the FAA 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. Special thanks to my father, Steve Blodgett, for 
his helpful input and enthuthiasm. Additonal thanks to Jason and my family for their loving 
encouragement. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss1/4 
NOTES
ON THE FACE OF IT? ESTABLISHING
JURISDICTION ON CLAIMS TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE FAA
Leda Moloff*
Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act enables a party with an
arbitration agreement to bring suit to compel arbitration if the dispute
between parties is brought in court. The U.S. Courts of Appeals are split
over how to establish jurisdiction when faced with a claim to compel
arbitration. The disagreement centers on whether the court may "look
through" to the underlying claim between parties to establish jurisdiction
or whether establishment ofjurisdiction must comply with the well-pleaded
complaint rule, a rule requiring the petitioner to state the reason for
jurisdiction on the face of their complaint to compel arbitration. This Note
argues that those circuits requiring compliance with the well-pleaded
complaint rule take the best approach.
INTRODUCTION
Today's American contracts frequently contain mandatory arbitration
agreements. 1 These contractual clauses require parties to resolve disputes
between them through arbitration, an alternative dispute resolution
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. Special thanks to my father,
Steve Blodgett, for his helpful input and enthusiasm. Additional thanks to Jason and my
family for their loving encouragement.
1. See Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative
History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 101, 102-03 (2002) (noting
"[t]he widespread use of arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts, called
the 'consumerization' of arbitration by [some scholars]"); Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and
Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 18
(2003) ("Companies providing a broad range of products and services are now using small
print contracts of adhesion to require their customers, employees, business partners, and
others to resolve any future disputes through binding arbitration, rather than through
litigation. Buy a house or car, open a bank account, obtain insurance, order a computer,
schedule termite extermination services, or secure a credit card, and the odds are high that
you will be 'agreeing' to resolve all related future disputes through arbitration .... One study
showed that the 'average Joe' in Los Angeles is now required to arbitrate disputes that arise
with respect to one-third of the major transactions in his life."); Imre S. Szalai, The Federal
Arbitration Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 319,
321 (2007) ("Arbitration agreements are now ubiquitous in American society ... ").
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
mechanism. Arbitration garners praise for its efficiency, speed, and ability
to provide parties with finality to their dispute.2 The Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), enacted by Congress in 1925, governs arbitration agreements. 3
Congress deemed the FAA necessary in order "to place . . . arbitration
agreement[s] 'upon the same footing as other contracts' [by ending] the
judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate."4 The
FAA also grew out of a congressional movement to relieve an
overburdened judiciary through dispute resolution alternatives. 5
Following the FAA's enactment, legal disputes erupted in the courts as
parties attempted to clarify the new legislation. 6 One such dispute arose
regarding the establishment of federal jurisdiction under section 4 of the
FAA. The resulting division in the courts' interpretation of this section
forms the basis of this Note.
Section 4 provides for a court to compel arbitration when a party fails,
neglects, or refuses to comply with an existing arbitration agreement in
"any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would
2. See infra notes 16, 17 and accompanying text. But cf Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration
Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts 1 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Working Papers,
Paper No. 70, 2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1074
&context-nyu/lewp (analyzing results from a study of 2858 contracts, concluding that
"sophisticated actors" are likely to preserve litigation as the dispute resolution mechanism,
and noting that "[t]his contrasts with widespread beliefs about arbitration's efficiency and
with imposition of mandatory arbitration clauses in some standardized consumer transactions
such as credit card and cellular phone contracts").
3. The United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat.
883, 883-86 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000)). The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) contains three chapters: provisions one through sixteen make up chapter one and
encompass United States arbitration law; the two other chapters encompass international
arbitration law. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307. See generally Matthew Parrott, Note, Is Compulsory
Court-Annexed Medical Malpractice Arbitration Constitutional? How the Debate Reflects a
Trend Towards Compulsion in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685,
2692-94 (2007) (discussing the history of the FAA).
4. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
24 (1991) ("[The FAA's] purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by
American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts." (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 219-20 & n.6; Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974))).
5. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 265 (1926) ("This statute is not an isolated change of an outworn rule of law. It
is a single step in a movement of growing momentum. The movement finds its origin in the
unfortunate congestion of the courts and in the delay, expense and technicality of
litigation.").
6. See George K. Foster, Courts Running into the Arbitration Act's Limitations: The
Supreme Court Could Help, but the Real Fix Is Up to Congress, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 2007,
at col. 1 ("As arbitration continues to grow in popularity as a means of resolving disputes,
U.S. courts increasingly are being called upon to address issues relating to arbitration .... ");
Szalai, supra note 1, at 322-23 (noting various legal disputes arising because of differing
interpretations of the FAA).
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have jurisdiction under Title 28." 7 Although the FAA is a federal act, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the FAA alone does not compel federal
question jurisdiction. Rather, there must be some other independent
jurisdictional basis for a federal court to hear the claim.8 Federal courts
have interpreted this "independent basis" requirement in two ways. Some
courts "look through" the claim to compel arbitration to the underlying
dispute between parties when determining if subject matter jurisdiction
exists. Other courts require the claim to compel arbitration to contain on its
face an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as diversity of
citizenship.
This issue arises in the following way. Two parties, X and Y, enter into
an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising between them. An issue
involving federal law-issue Z-arises between the two parties. Party X
refuses to bring the issue to arbitration and instead brings the claim to court.
When X brings issue Z to court, Y then challenges the suit with a claim to
compel arbitration based on their prior agreement. Since the FAA does not
provide an independent basis to establish federal jurisdiction, the question is
whether issue Z can provide the necessary jurisdictional requirement for
Y's petition to compel arbitration, or if section 4 requires an independent
basis for jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship. There is a circuit split
on this issue. Some circuits allow issue Z to establish jurisdiction over the
claim to compel arbitration, while others require an independent
jurisdictional basis. This means that in some circuits it is possible to choose
to bring a claim to compel arbitration in either state or federal court, while
in others the claim may only be brought in state court.
This Note examines the dueling approaches of the courts in their
interpretation of section 4 of the FAA. Resolution of this issue is important
because a court that looks to the underlying dispute between parties allows
for an expanded definition of federal subject matter jurisdiction and also
affects where a plaintiff can bring a petition to compel arbitration. 9 Part I
of this Note discusses the history of arbitration generally, the bases for
federal jurisdiction, the history and purpose behind the well-pleaded
complaint rule, and the historical context of the FAA's enactment. Part II
analyzes the conflicting views among the circuits regarding this legal
7. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
8. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.32
(1983) ("The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court
jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty
to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order
compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a suit
on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citizenship or some other
independent basis for federal jurisdiction before the order can issue.").
9. See Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597, 616 (11th Cir. 2007) (Marcus, J.,
concurring) (noting that resolution of this issue is important because looking through to the
underlying claim "considerably expands federal court jurisdiction"); Szalai, supra note 1, at
322-23 ("This jurisdictional issue is of great interest because of its direct impact on the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.").
2008]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
debate. Part II.A discusses those circuits that interpret the plain language of
the statute to allow the court to "look through" to the underlying claim to
establish jurisdiction. This approach allows the party attempting to compel
arbitration to determine jurisdiction by way of the underlying issue between
parties. Part II.B discusses the circuits that interpret section 4 through a
narrow reading of the well-pleaded complaint rule and require the face of
the arbitration petition to state the reason for federal jurisdiction. Part III
advocates for all courts to adopt the second interpretation of section 4
because it reinforces two longstanding procedural principles: the well-
pleaded complaint rule, and the requirement that federal courts be of limited
jurisdiction. Furthermore, Part III argues that congressional revision of
section 4 of the FAA would provide the clearest resolution of this issue.
I. ARBITRATION'S USE AND HISTORY, FEDERAL COURTS' JURISDICTION,
AND THE HISTORY OF THE FAA
This part examines the background and history behind this legal issue.
Part L.A introduces the history and use of arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism. Part I.B describes the procedure used by the judiciary to
establish federal jurisdiction and summarizes the purpose of the well-
pleaded complaint rule. Part I.C summarizes the history of the FAA and
specifically analyzes the purpose of section 4 of the Act. This final
subsection also addresses legal commentary that recommends congressional
rewording of section 4.
A. Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism
This section looks generally to arbitration as a mode of alternative
dispute resolution. Part I.A.1 provides an overview of arbitration by
describing its use in practice and its various advantages and disadvantages.
Part I.A.2 traces the history of arbitration, particularly the historical judicial
disinclination to uphold arbitration agreements. Part I.A.3 looks at the slow
acceptance by the judiciary of arbitration as a valid dispute resolution
mechanism in American courts, an acceptance which has evolved into
today's highly deferential approach to arbitration agreements.
1. Overview
Arbitration functions as a way for parties to resolve disputes through
confidential and informal proceedings. 10 The arbitrator, an impartial third
10. See ALAN ScoTr RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 28 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed.
2002) (noting that the American Arbitration Association (AAA), created in 1926, provides
resources and rules for parties entering into arbitration, and that over 194,000 arbitration
cases were filed with the AAA in 2000). See generally THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU,
ARBITRATION IN A NUT SHELL 10 (2007) (outlining the general format of arbitration
proceedings).
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person, presides over the arbitration. I' The arbitrator usually follows a
protocol including the following elements: "initiation, preparation,
prehearing conferences, hearing, decision-making, and award."' 2  The
parties usually confer authority upon the arbitrator to issue a decision
binding all the parties following the hearing. 13 If the parties want the
arbitrator to reach a binding decision, they must all agree and are then
contractually bound. 14 A court will treat an arbitration agreement as a
separate valid contract, even if it deems the general contract between the
parties void or invalid. 15 In other words, the arbitration clause still governs
disputes between parties, notwithstanding the enforceability of the
underlying contract.
Parties frequently choose arbitration to govern disputes because it
provides an alternative to litigation's lengthy delays, expenses, and "[t]he
failure . .. to reach a decision regarded as just when measured by the
standards of the business world."'16 Other advantages of arbitration over
11. See MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (Gabriel Wilner ed., 2003); see also STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 210 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 4th ed. 2003)
(noting that arbitration is different from other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
because the arbitrator, as a neutral party, retains control over the proceedings).
12. JOHN W. COOLEY, THE ARBITRATOR'S HANDBOOK § 1.1, at 2 (Anthony J. Bocchino
et al. ed., 2d ed. 2005); see also EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT § 2.2, at 31 (2006) (enumerating arbitration's steps as: (1) an
agreement between the parties to use arbitration, (2) a dispute between these parties, (3)
submission of the dispute to arbitrators, and (4) a confidential and final arbitral award);
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 209 (noting that "[b]ecause arbitration is a private
dispute resolution procedure, designed by the parties to serve their particular needs, it cannot
be defined or described in a manner that will encompass all arbitration systems"); Jill I.
Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 329, 358 (2006). "'(1) [T]he parties choose to have a dispute or disputes
decided by a third party, called an arbitrator; (2) the parties choose the arbitrator or a method
for his or her selection; (3) the arbitrator hears the dispute; (4) the arbitrator makes a binding
award; (5) the arbitrator's decision is, subject to very limited grounds of review, final and
enforceable by State law in the same manner as a judgment .... Obviously, the fewer of the
five characteristics listed are present, the less likely the process is to be called arbitration."'
Id. (quoting IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 7-8 (1992)).
13. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 10, at 10; COOLEY, supra note 12, § 1.1.1, at 5
("Awards are normally short, definite, and final as to all matters under submission....
Depending on the parties' pre-arbitration agreement, the award will be binding or non-
binding."); American Arbitration Association, Arbitration & Mediation,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749 (last visited Aug. 16, 2008) ("Awards are made in
writing and are generally final and binding on the parties in the case.").
14. CARBONNEAU, supra note 10, at 11 ("By entering into an arbitration contract, the
parties voluntarily abandon their right to judicial relief and, in effect, create a private system
of adjudication that presumably is better adapted to their transactional needs.").
15. See STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 60 (2002) ("As a
result [of this separability], it is entirely possible to have a binding arbitration agreement,
even when one of the central issues in the case is whether the substantive contract at issue is
void.").
16. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 5, at 269; see also BENNETT, supra note 15, at 6-8;
BRUNET ET AL., supra note 12, §§ 1.1-1.9, at 3-29; American Arbitration Association, supra
20081
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litigation include the confidentiality of the proceedings, the opportunity to
select the arbitrator, greater flexibility, and greater affordability. 17
On the other hand, many parties do not enter into arbitration agreements
because they prefer dispute resolution through litigation. Some parties
prefer litigation proceedings because of concerns regarding arbitration's
limitations on discovery proceedings, the need for preliminary relief, and an
arbitration award's binding-i.e., nonappealable-nature. 18
2. Judicial Disfavor
Parties have used arbitration as a means of settling disputes for
centuries. 19 In England, "[i]t furnished almost exclusively the tribunals for
the settlement of business disputes in the medieval period, and in [the
eighteenth century] was practically the sole remedy open to English
merchants." 20 Arbitration came to the United States by way of England's
merchant trade. 21
Historically, English courts refused to uphold arbitration agreements to
avoid being ousted of jurisdiction.22 As merchants adopted the use of
arbitration clauses in the United States, the American judiciary, in response,
adopted English common law hostility toward arbitration agreements. 23
Prior to the twentieth century, American courts, like their English
counterparts, were unreceptive to arbitration petitions that took parties
outside of the courtroom to resolve disputes. 24 When parties brought
petitions to compel arbitration before the court, judges simply refused to
note 13 (noting that the benefits of arbitration include the avoidance of litigation's slow
pace, expense, lack of confidentiality, and public disfavor).
17. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 10, at 18-19.
18. BENNETT, supra note 15, at 8; see also COOLEY, supra note 12, §1.1.2, at 6 (noting
that arbitration's limitations include a lack of accountability of arbitrators and burdens from
enacted legislation, among others).
19. See BENNETr, supra note 15, at 9 ("Arbitration is mentioned in Greek mythology
and the Bible."); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 5, at 266 ("The use of arbitration dates back to
the earliest days of which we have historical knowledge.").
20. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 5, at 266; see also BENNETT, supra note 15, at 9 (noting
arbitration's establishment by maritime merchants); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 209
("[Arbitration] was used as early as the thirteenth century by English merchants who
preferred to have their disputes resolved according to their own customs (the law merchant)
rather than by public law.").
21. COOLEY, supra note 12, at 1.
22. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 n.6 (1985) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)); accord RAU ET AL., supra note 10, at 57 ("Somewhat more
cynically, one might also suppose that [this judicial hostility] originated in considerations of
competition for business, at a time when judge's salaries still depended on fees paid by
litigants.").
23. Szalai, supra note 1, at 325.
24. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) ("The Arbitration Act sought
to 'overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce any arbitration
agreement."' (quoting United States Arbitration Act of 1925: Hearing on S. 4214 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 6 (1923) (statement of Sen. Thomas J. Walsh)));
BENNETT, supra note 15, at 10 (citing to an 1845 Massachusetts case as a good
demonstration of the "judicial antipathy toward the process" of arbitration).
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enforce them. This left plaintiffs with no alternative but to bring a lawsuit,
which "the court would hear . . . without regard to the agreement to
arbitrate." 25
Despite arbitration being a private remedy, courts frequently exercise
authority in arbitration disputes. Courts, "at a minimum, [have] the judicial
power to enforce the agreement to arbitrate and to confirm and enforce an
arbitral award."'26 In sum, courts' willingness to hear claims to compel
arbitration evolved slowly following the FAA's enactment.
3. Judicial Acceptance
After passage of the FAA in 1925, Congress appealed to the courts to
shift from their longstanding antipathy toward arbitration agreements. 27
This shift did not come immediately, however, reflecting the judiciary's
ingrained skepticism toward these agreements. 28 It was not until the 1970s,
a time when the Supreme Court upheld a number of international arbitration
agreements, that "cracks in the Supreme Court's antipathy toward
arbitration agreements began to appear." 29  The Court noticed that
arbitration worked particularly well with international disputes because it
negated local prejudice and deincentivized hastily brought litigation.30
Following the Court's initial support, a greater degree of deference for
arbitration agreements followed: "Since the mid-1980s the Supreme Court
has issued numerous decisions stating that arbitration should be looked
upon with favor and that, with few exceptions, arbitration clauses should be
enforced."' 31  Today, courts generally enforce arbitration agreements
25. RAU ET AL., supra note 10, at 58. Rau also notes that despite the fact that courts
refused claims to compel arbitration, they generally enforced awards granted through
arbitration. Id.
26. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 12, § 2.3(1), at 33.
27. Cmty. St. Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597, 631 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he legislative
history of the FAA makes unmistakably clear that its purpose was 'to ensure judicial
enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate' by 'overrul[ing] the judiciary's
longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate."' (second alteration in original)
(quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 219-20)). See generally BENNETT, supra note
15, at 29, 32 (explaining that, thirty years after Congress's adoption of the FAA, states
adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act in an attempt to eradicate state antipathy toward
arbitration, and that, in 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws drafted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, incorporating developments in
arbitration law).
28. BENNETT, supra note 15, at 11 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), as an
example of the Supreme Court's continued questioning of arbitration agreements and "the
competence of arbitrator[s']" abilities in the 1950s).
29. Id. (mentioning Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), as one of several
cases in the 1970s demonstrating a shift in attitude toward the FAA).
30. Id.
31. Stemlight, supra note 1, at 19; see also Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private:
The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 776-77 (2002) ("The
United States Supreme Court, followed loyally, and for the most part enthusiastically, by the
lower federal courts, has made the strong preference for enforcement of arbitration clauses a
matter of federal preemption, so broadly and firmly expressed as to make it nearly
2008]
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between parties without their former prejudice, and frequently incorporate
arbitration-and other forms of alternative dispute resolution-into regular
court proceedings. 32
B. Establishing Federal Jurisdiction
This section analyzes the ways that courts recognize federal jurisdiction.
The means of recognizing federal jurisdiction is the underpinning for the
circuit split discussed in this Note. Part I.B. 1 details how to establish
federal jurisdiction generally, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, specifically.
Part I.B.2 describes the well-pleaded complaint rule and how Supreme
Court precedent establishes the rule's purpose.
1. Limiting Federal Jurisdiction
Federal courts, unlike state courts, are courts of limited jurisdiction.33
Accordingly, a party may only establish subject matter jurisdiction in
federal court in one of three ways: (1) pursuant to a unique statutory grant,
(2) through federal question jurisdiction brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or
(3) by way of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).34
Federal question jurisdiction only applies to claims that arise under
Article III of the U.S. Constitution and through congressional statutory
grant.35 Article III of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court the
impossible for even those state judges or state legislatures who might be so moved to
exercise any restraining influence at all.").
32. See BENNETT, supra note 15, at 11-12; Teressa L. Elliott, Responsibility of the
Courts in Motions to Compel Arbitration, 32 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 89, 97 (2006) (noting three
Supreme Court cases whose opinions indicate an "attitude of the Court towards arbitration in
general [that] is strongly supportive of arbitration").
33. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Nolan v.
Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1064 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The federal courts, of course, do not
automatically possess the authority to hear and determine all types of actions conceivably
covered by the Constitution. The provisions of Article III specify only the outer limits of
federal subject matter jurisdiction.").
34. See Ali Razzaghi, Dominguez-Cota v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.: A Convenient
Forum for Addressing Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 74 U. CN. L. REv. 689, 692-93 (2005)
("An action may be litigated in federal court under § 1331 if the claim arises 'under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.' With this requirement fulfilled, the court
would lack subject matter jurisdiction only if the claim is insubstantial and frivolous or if the
claim is immaterial and solely made for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction." (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2000))); Qian A. Gao, Note, "Salvage Operations Are Ordinarily Preferable
to the Wrecking Ball": Barring Challenges to Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 2369, 2372-73 (2005).
35. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 ("Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute ...."); Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 692 (1986) ("In origin and design, federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction; they exercise only the authority conferred on them by Art[icle] III and
by congressional enactments pursuant thereto."); Gao, supra note 34, at 2372 ("Federal
courts... may only adjudicate cases that are within the judicial power as defined in the
Constitution or awarded by congressional grant. Without such jurisdiction, the case must be
dismissed." (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2, cl. 1; Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978))).
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judicial power to try "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority. ' 36 However, it was not until Congress
passed the Act of 1875, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331, that the lower
federal courts were also granted "original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 37
Congress has the right to "establish priorities for the allocation of judicial
resources in defining the jurisdiction of federal courts" when enacting
legislation, leaving other issues to the state courts.38 Further, jurisdiction
may "not ... be expanded by judicial decree." 39
Right to relief in federal question jurisdiction has been deemed to exist
only when "'plaintiffs' right to relief depend[s] necessarily on a substantial
question of federal law."' 40  Most cases arising under federal question
jurisdiction are brought because federal law creates the cause of action, but
the courts also may establish jurisdiction if the "right to relief depends upon
the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United
States." 41 Federal courts assume cases are outside their jurisdiction, placing
the burden on the party asserting jurisdiction to establish it.42
2. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
As stated above, Congress first vested federal question jurisdiction in the
lower federal courts in 1875, and that statutory grant was later codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1331. 43 Under section 1331, federal jurisdiction arises when
36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). But see RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
MODER 1 APPROACH 886 (4th ed. 2005) (explaining that, just because there is congressional
authorization, the claim will not always fall under § 1331, as exemplified by Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900), wherein, despite federal legislation regarding
mining claims, suits were instead determined by looking to the "local customs or rules").
38. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 36 (1980).
39. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citing Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951)).
40. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986) (quoting
Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 766 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th Cir. 1985)).
41. Id. at 809 n.5 (quoting Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199
(1921)).
42. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; see also Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916
(5th Cir. 2001) ("We must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the
burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.").
43. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. See generally Donald L. Doemberg,
There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 601 & n. 16
(1987) (discussing the history of federal question jurisdiction and noting that Congress first
allowed it through the Midnight Judges Act of 1801, which was later repealed, not to
reemerge until the 1875 Act); Gao, supra note 34, at 2374 ("Congress might have placed
federal question litigation in the federal courts as opposed to the state courts because of
diverse considerations including faithfulness to Supreme Court rulings, responsiveness to
Supreme Court supervision, less susceptibility to pressure from local interest groups, greater
uniformity, and a higher likelihood of expertise in federal law.").
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there is an issue of federal law.44 In other words, federal law must
comprise some part of the claim in order to establish subject matter
jurisdiction.45  Establishing jurisdiction also requires meeting the
requirements of the well-pleaded complaint rule. This rule works in tandem
with section 1331 by requiring that the face of the complaint indicate how
the claim arises under federal jurisdiction.46
a. History
The well-pleaded complaint rule evolved over more than a century of
common law. In 1894 the Supreme Court dismissed Tennessee v. Union &
Planters' Bank for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.47 Justice Horace
Gray dismissed the case after holding that a plaintiff may not establish
jurisdiction "arising under" federal law with an argument based on what the
opposing party may include in its claim. 48
Later, in 1908, the Supreme Court decided the pivotal case of Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, further clarifying the Court's position
on the rule of a well-pleaded complaint:
It is the settled interpretation ... that a suit arises under the Constitution
and laws of the United States only when the plaintiffs statement of his
own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that
Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated
defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by
some provision of the Constitution of the United States. 49
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); see
MARCUS ET AL., supra note 37, at 871.
45. Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal
Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (2004) ("The Supreme Court interpreted ["arising
under"], as it appears in Article III, to extend the constitutional grant of federal judiciary
power to every case where federal law potentially forms an ingredient of a claim.").
46. See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1247-48 (2004) ("Section
1331, the federal question grant, reads as broadly as the constitutional grant, and if it had
been interpreted this broadly, any case with a potential federal question could have been
brought in federal court. Supreme Court decisions make broad inroads into this reading of
section 1331, the most important exception being the well-pleaded complaint rule, which
eliminates the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts over many cases that nonetheless
contain federal questions.").
47. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
48. See id. at 464 (noting that "a suggestion of one party, that the other will or may set
up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not make the suit one
arising under that Constitution or those laws").
49. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). See
generally Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 1781, 1782 (1998) ("One of the keystones of this limiting construction [is the] 'well-
pleaded complaint' rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mottley and constantly reaffirmed by the federal judiciary ....").
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With this holding, the Court firmly established the requirement that a
plaintiff must comply with the well-pleaded complaint rule to survive a
motion to dismiss.
b. Recent Reaffirmation
More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the role of the well-pleaded
complaint rule when establishing federal jurisdiction: "We have long held
that '[t]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed
by the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which provides that federal
jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of




In short, the well-pleaded complaint rule requires a claim brought in
federal court to demonstrate federal jurisdiction on its face, barring a party
from conferring jurisdiction by merely anticipating a federal element within
the opposing party's defense or counterclaim. 51
C. History of the FAA
Today, arbitration clauses are governed by the FAA. This section
summarizes Congress's intent underlying the FAA and specifically
analyzes section 4 of the FAA. Part I.C.1 analyzes Congress's original
intent in enacting the FAA. Part I.C.2 introduces section 4 of the FAA.
Part I.C.3 considers the opinions of two legal scholars on rewriting section
4 to clarify its meaning.
1. Reasons for Enactment: The Original Intent of Congress
Congress enacted the FAA in an attempt to eliminate judicial antagonism
toward arbitration. 52 More specifically, the FAA was an effort to rectify the
historical common law hostility toward arbitration agreements and the lack
of state statutes requiring judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements.53
The FAA intended to put arbitration agreements on the same level as other
50. Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
51. See Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914) (stating that the complaint must
be "unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought
the defendant may interpose"); Doemberg, supra note 43, at 599 (noting that "federal
question jurisdiction does not exist unless the federal question appears in the 'right' place,
that is, in the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint").
52. See BENNETT, supra note 15, at 17 ("It is not an overstatement to say that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) is the single most important element of modem American arbitration
law and policy."); supra note 4 and accompanying text.
53. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (noting that, when enacting
the FAA, Congress faced two main problems: "the old common law hostility toward
arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration
agreements"); Elliott, supra note 32, at 91 ("The United States Supreme Court stated that
with the passage of the FAA, 'Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration."'
(quoting Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10)).
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contracts by providing a means of enforcement.54 The Act also functioned
to take pressure off of an overburdened court system through the
enforcement of these agreements to arbitrate.55
The House report accompanying the Act further clarified the reason for
the Act's enactment.56 First, the report indicated that the FAA resulted
from American courts mirroring English courts' refusal to enforce
arbitration agreements. 57  The report further stated that the judiciary
believed only an act of Congress could enable the judiciary to overcome
what appeared to be unnecessary antagonism toward arbitration petitions.58
The report concluded that the Act "simply [declares] that such agreements
for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal
courts for their enforcement. '59
In accord with congressional intent, the Act enabled, and in fact required,
courts to enforce arbitration agreements, a trend that they grudgingly
accepted after its enactment.60  However, once courts began hearing
arbitration issues, numerous conflicting interpretations of the FAA
emerged. Some examples of these conflicts include: "whether the FAA is
applicable in state court and preempts state laws; whether the FAA should
mandate enforcement of arbitration clauses in employment or consumer
contracts; the arbitrability of statutory claims under the FAA; and whether
class-wide arbitration is permitted under the FAA.' '61  An additional
conflict, which forms the basis of this Note, arose regarding how to
establish federal jurisdiction for a petition to compel arbitration under
section 4 of the FAA.
54. See BENNETT, supra note 15, at 17.
55. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 12, § 2.4(2)(A), at 37 ("In short, [after enactment of
the FAA] courts now had power to enforce valid arbitration agreements to arbitrate existing
and future disputes by specific performance and to stay any pending litigation until the
arbitration was concluded."); supra note 5.
56. See H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1-2 (1924).
57. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 & n.6 ("Some centuries
ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to
enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted
from their jurisdiction. This jealousy... was adopted ... by the American courts.").
58. See id. ("The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be
overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticised [sic] the
rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it.").
59. Id. Contemporaneous scholarship pointed to the Act providing "a new procedural
remedy .... No one is required to make an agreement to arbitrate. Such action by a party is
entirely voluntary. When the agreement to arbitrate is made, it is not left outside the law....
It is merely a new method for enforcing a contract .. " Cohen & Dayton, supra note 5, at
279.
60. See supra Part I.A.3; see also JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL 139-40 (2d ed. 2001) ("Judicial attitudes toward arbitration
began to change in the early twentieth century with the passage of state and federal statutes
promoting arbitration."). But see Richard L. Barnes, Buckeye, Bull's-Eye, or Moving Target:
The FAA, Compulsory Arbitration, and Common-Law Contract, 31 VT. L. REv. 141, 142
(2006) (noting that some jurisdictions are still antagonistic toward arbitration agreements).
61. Szalai, supra note 1, at 321-22.
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2. Section Four
Section 4 of the FAA addresses the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 62 The text of section 4 states, in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement. 63
Courts were initially unclear whether FAA claims could be brought in
state court since the FAA is a federal act.64 The Supreme Court in
Southland Corp. v. Keating6 5 clarified this uncertainty. In Southland, the
Court concluded that FAA claims can be brought in state court and
therefore do not contain any additional limitations under state law.6 6 The
Court also noted that, since state courts adjudicate an "overwhelming
proportion of all civil litigation in this country," Congress must not have
intended to "limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal
court jurisdiction. '67  Rather, if the FAA intended to put arbitration
agreements on the same footing as other contracts, it "would frustrate
Congressional intent" if such claims could only be tried if the dispute was
subject to federal jurisdiction.68
The Court further clarified the jurisdictional parameters of the FAA in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.69 There,
the Court concluded that the FAA requires an independent basis for
jurisdiction because the Act does not confer federal question jurisdiction on
its own. 70 This holding led to the disputed issue addressed in this Note,
which arises from the language of the statute. Specifically, the conflicting
terminology at issue is that a party trying to compel arbitration "may
petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement,
would have jurisdiction under Title 28."71 There are two competing
62. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 12, § 2.3(2)(A), at 34 (noting that agreements to
arbitrate are enforced by the court after determining: (1) if the parties' agreement actually
contained an agreement to arbitrate, (2) if the arbitration agreement was properly formulated,
(3) if the dispute between parties came within the reach of the original agreement, (4) that no
fraud existed, and (5) that the dispute could actually find resolution through arbitration).
63. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
64. See generally Drahozal, supra note 1.
65. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
66. Id. at 15-16.
67. Id. at 15.
68. Id.
69. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
70. See id. at 26 n.32; BRUNET ET AL., supra note 12, at 37 ("The courts have concluded
that the FAA does not create federal jurisdiction. Rather, federal jurisdiction depends upon
diversity of citizenship or a claim arising under some other federal statute.").
71. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
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interpretations of this clause. Federal district courts recognize jurisdiction
under the FAA either broadly, by "looking through" to the underlying
dispute, or narrowly, by adhering strictly to the well-pleaded complaint rule
and requiring the face of the complaint to state the reason for jurisdiction. 72
3. Proposed Rewriting of Section 4
Some scholars propose resolving the differing interpretations of section 4
through congressional revision of its contentious language. 73 First, Stephen
J. Ware recommends congressional revision of section 4 that narrows the
applicable jurisdiction in a claim to compel arbitration. 74 Specifically,
Professor Ware advocates for Congress to rewrite sections 1 and 2 of the
FAA so that they apply in state or federal court, while the remaining
sections (including section 4) only apply in federal court.75 Ware notes that
having all but sections 1 and 2 apply exclusively in federal court "would
both strengthen the contractual approach to arbitration law and clarify the
scope of the FAA."'76
Edward Brunet believes Southland missed the point. Professor Brunet
notes that "[t]here would unquestionably be federal subject jurisdiction
under this statute if courts used the typical inquiry: subject matter
jurisdiction exists because the basis of federal jurisdiction is predicated
upon a federal statutory claim." 77 Brunet's commentary revolves around
72. Compare Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 367 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the presence of a federal question in the underlying dispute is sufficient to support subject
matter jurisdiction), with Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F.3d 263, 269 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that "the nature of the underlying dispute ... is not part of a 'well-pleaded
complaint' so it does not support federal subject matter jurisdiction). Congress is currently
contemplating a revision of the FAA, but the amendments proposed by Congress address
concern over mandatory arbitration agreements. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S.
1782, 11 0th Cong. § 2 (2007). The proposed amendments, however, do not address the
jurisdictional issues that courts disagree upon, instead focusing only on concerns over
fairness to all parties throughout the arbitration process. See id. § 4.
73. See BRUNET ET AL., supra note 12, at 1 ("The time is right for a complete
reformulation of federal arbitration law .... The old FAA, passed in the Roaring Twenties,
is completely outmoded."); Foster, supra note 6 (advocating for "congressional overhaul of
the FAA ... so that there at last would be a modern, comprehensive federal arbitration law
in the United States," because the multitude of issues cannot all be solved by the Supreme
Court).
74. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 12, at 346. Stephan J. Ware's revision reads as follows:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a
civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the
controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.
Id.
75. See id. at 89-90, 125 ("A [rievised FAA should continue to create no federal
jurisdiction because experience has not.., shown a significant or widespread problem with
state court application of the FAA.").
76. Id. at 126.
77. Id. at 320.
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whether a revised FAA should eliminate the independent-basis requirement
for subject matter jurisdiction.7 8 Brunet questions whether this type of
revision benefits those claims to compel arbitration by both curing the
anomaly of the legislation and "normaliz[ing] the construction of the FAA
to that of a typical federal substantive statute." 79 Brunet notes that to find
subject matter jurisdiction inherent in the FAA would increase defendant
forum shopping because of the increased availability of removal
jurisdiction. On this point, Brunet notes that "[t]his right, however, may not
necessarily be viewed as a negative development, because it is a
countervailing way to neutralize the original choice of the state forum by
the plaintiff. '80
In the end, Brunet concludes that despite the potential benefits, Congress
need not revise the FAA for two reasons: (1) allowing federal subject
matter jurisdiction to arise under federal law requires a compelling
justification which may not be present in the context of the FAA, and (2)
state court judges should continue to decide claims to compel arbitration
because these claims generally include state contract interpretation. 81
Therefore, Brunet states that "while an anomaly, the lack of federal court
subject matter jurisdiction for actions brought under the FAA is not enough
of a problem to justify [an] amendment. '82
II. THE EXISTING CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHETHER THE COURTS SHOULD
INTERPRET SECTION 4 OF THE FAA TO FIND FEDERAL JURISDICTION BASED
ON THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE
This part discusses the legal debate over whether the language of section
4 of the FAA allows a court to "look through" the claim to compel
arbitration to the underlying dispute to determine if subject matter
jurisdiction exists, or if the petition to compel arbitration itself provides the
basis for subject matter jurisdiction. On one side, the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits look to the "plain language"
of section 4 of the FAA and, in doing so, "look through" the complaint to
compel arbitration to establish jurisdiction. On the other side, some
courts-most notably the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Seventh Circuits-require that, to follow the well-pleaded complaint rule,
the reason for subject matter jurisdiction must be stated on the face of the
complaint to compel arbitration. Part II.A examines the relevant Fourth and
Eleventh Circuit decisions as well as legal scholarship in accord with those
circuits' approach. Part II.B analyzes two opinions on the other side of the
debate that do not examine the underlying dispute to establish federal
jurisdiction; this part also examines a concurring opinion from the Eleventh
Circuit in accord with the latter approach.
78. Id. at 321.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 322.
82. Id. at 323.
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A. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits'Approach: "Looking Through" to
the Underlying Dispute
This section will discuss opinions that establish federal subject matter
jurisdiction by "looking through" to the underlying dispute between the
parties. Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have ruled that the well-
pleaded complaint rule does not limit a finding of federal jurisdiction under
section 4 of the FAA, although this is currently under review in the
Eleventh Circuit. 83 Part II.A.1 analyzes the Eleventh Circuit's holding in
Community State Bank v. Strong,84 as well as the case on which it was
based.85 Part II.A.2 examines the Fourth Circuit's 200586 and 200787
dispositions in Discover Bank v. Vaden. Part II.A.3 looks to legal
scholarship in accord with this approach.
1. Eleventh Circuit: Community State Bank and Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
The Eleventh Circuit's current approach is to look to the underlying
dispute between parties as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction on claims
brought under section 4 of the FAA. However, this precedent may now be
in flux.88 Five months after handing down Community State Bank in April
2007, a case following the Eleventh Circuit's precedent of looking to the
underlying dispute to recognize federal jurisdiction, the court granted a
rehearing en banc and vacated the decision. 89 This pending rehearing may
reaffirm the precedent developed in the Eleventh Circuit or could instead
align the circuit with the other side of this legal issue.
The now-vacated decision in Community State Bank relied on Tamiami
Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians (Tamiami Ill), an Eleventh
Circuit decision that reconfirmed the circuit's precedent of looking through
83. See Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 508 F.3d 576 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (vacating opinion
and granting rehearing en banc on this issue); infra note 89 and accompanying text.
84. 485 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, Cmty. State
Bank, 508 F.3d 576.
85. See Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians (Tamiami II1), 177 F.3d
1212 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
86. Discover Bank v. Vaden (Vaden 1), 396 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 2005).
87. Discover Bank v. Vaden (Vaden I1), 489 F.3d 594 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128
S. Ct. 1651 (2008).
88. See infra Part II.B.4.
89. See Cmty. State Bank, 508 F.3d at 576. See also Note, The Politics of En Banc
Review, 102 HARV. L. REv. 864, 864 (1989) ("En banc review gives all the judges on a
circuit court of appeals an opportunity to reconsider a decision rendered by a three-judge
panel. When a majority of active circuit judges votes to rehear an appeal, at the suggestion
of either a party or a circuit judge, the original panel decision is vacated and the case is
usually set for reargument. In theory, en banc review is reserved for rare situations-to
resolve intracircuit conflicts or cases of 'exceptional importance.' Recently, however, some
circuit courts have been employing en banc review in an increasing number and range of
cases.").
[Vol. 77
JURISDICTION UNDER THE FAA
to the underlying claim to find subject matter jurisdiction under section 4 of
the FAA. 90 Adopting the language of Tamiami III, the court in Community
State Bank interpreted section 4 as follows:
[Section 4] empowers a district court to issue an order compelling
arbitration if the court, "save for [the arbitration] agreement, would have
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action .... ." Thus, it is appropriate
for us to "look through" [the] arbitration request at the underlying
licensing dispute in order to determine whether [the] complaint states a
federal question.91
The action in Community State Bank arose from a payday loan, a short-
term high-interest loan that the lender expects the recipient to repay by the
next payday. 92 The respondent to this action, James E. Strong, took out a
payday loan from Georgia Cash America, Inc., the petitioner. 93 The terms
of the promissory note included a clause that the loan agreement was
subject to arbitration under the FAA.94
Strong did not repay the loan, but instead brought suit against the banks,
asserting six causes of action under Georgia law. 95 The causes of action all
"essentially alleg[ed] that the loan [was] usurious and therefore
unenforceable." 96 The defendants removed the case from state court to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 97 When the court
permitted removal to district court, Strong moved to remand the case back
to state court on the grounds that the case lacked federal jurisdiction and
"that removal had been improvidently granted. '98 While that motion was
pending, the defendant banks moved simultaneously to compel arbitration
under the FAA.99 After considering the motions from both sides, the
district court judge held in favor of Strong, remanding to state court on the
grounds that the case was not removable. 100
Contemporaneous to the above proceedings, the defendants also brought
an independent motion in federal district court to compel arbitration and
stay proceedings under the FAA. 101 The defendants argued therein that
90. See Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 605-06 (citing Tamiami III, 177 F.3d 1212); see
also National Arbitration Forum, Eleventh Circuit: Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction over a
Petition to Compel Arbitration if Underlying Dispute Presents Federal Question,
http://adrforum.com/adrCaseDetails.aspx?caseid=934 (last visited August 19, 2008) (noting
that Community State Bank relied on the test from Tamiami III to establish jurisdiction).
91. Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 606 (second alteration in original) (quoting Tamiami
III, 177 F.3d at 1223 n. 11, and citing 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)).
92. See id. at 600.
93. See id. at 601. Petitioners noted that Georgia Cash America, Inc. provides payday
loans on behalf of Community State Bank, another petitioner in the action that is chartered
by the state of South Dakota. Id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 601-02.




100. Id. at 602-03.
101. Id. at 603.
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Strong's refusal to arbitrate "threatens [them] with severe injury." 102 This
petition before the court alleged federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and section 4 of the FAA. 103 Regarding this second petition, Strong
moved to dismiss for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.10 4 The
district court granted Strong's motion to dismiss, and the defendant banks
appealed. 10 5 The issue of where jurisdiction attaches is significant in this
context because it potentially expands federal jurisdiction in frequently
brought FAA disputes.10 6
The district court applied the Tamiami III test to determine whether
federal question jurisdiction existed on the section 4 claim: "[I]t is
appropriate for us to 'look through' [the] arbitration request at the
underlying . . . dispute in order to determine whether [the] complaint states
a federal question."'1 7  The Community State Bank court affirmed the
district court's use of Tamiami III as precedent. 10 8 Community State Bank
further noted that Tamiami III looked to the textual language of section 4 to
reach its holding by interpreting the statute's language of "save for such
agreement" to mean "'save for [the arbitration] agreement,"' and that this
interpretation "directs a district court to take subject matter jurisdiction over
a § 4 petition if it would have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute-
to-be-arbitrated."' 09
The defendant banks indicated in their petition that, as part of the
arbitration proceedings, they would seek a ruling from the court declaring
that the loan itself was lawful and that the loan's interest rate was governed
by section 27 of the Federal Depository Insurance Act.110 Since the banks
were bringing this claim pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, the
court considered whether the action to be declared upon arose under federal
law (since a federal court can only hear declaratory judgment actions on
federal issues). "'1 The court found that federal question jurisdiction existed
over the declaratory judgment action because of the federal nature of
potential section 27 claims and that the respondent could file under the
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; therefore,




106. See id. at 615-16 (Marcus, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 606 (quoting Tamiami 111, 177 F.3d 1212, 1223 n. 11 (I1 th Cir. 1999)).
108. See id. ("We read Tamiami III as holding that § 4 directs a district court to take
subject matter jurisdiction over a § 4 petition if it would have subject matter jurisdiction over
the dispute-to-be-arbitrated.").
109. Id. at 603 n.7, 606 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)).
110. See id. at 600, 607 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (2000)).
111. See id. at 608. The Declaratory Judgment Act states, in relevant part,
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,.., any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
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because the court there will "'look through' under Tamiami III [to
determine whether the] action arises under federal law, the district court had
federal question jurisdiction over petitioners' action to compel
arbitration."112
2. Fourth Circuit: Discover Bank v. Vaden
In accord with the Eleventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit looks through to
the underlying claim between the parties to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. Discover Bank v. Vaden arose from a suit brought by Discover
Bank and its affiliate Discover Financial Services (collectively, Discover)
against Betty E. Vaden (Vaden) for nonpayment of her credit card
balance.' 1 3 After Discover brought suit, Vaden filed a number of class-
action counterclaims against Discover. 114 Discover then brought an action
in federal court to compel arbitration of Vaden's counterclaims under
section 4 of the FAA.115
The first time the Fourth Circuit heard Discover Bank v. Vaden (Vaden
1), it established federal subject matter jurisdiction under section 4 of the
FAA by looking to the underlying dispute between the parties. 116
Discussing this point, the Vaden I court acknowledged that invoking section
4 of the FAA alone does not constitute federal subject matter jurisdiction,
so the court analyzed the underlying dispute between the parties to establish
federal jurisdiction. 117 The court noted the possibilities of approaching the
issue through either a "broad" or "narrow" view. 118 The broad view,
followed by the Eleventh Circuit in Tamiami 111,l19 enables the court to
analyze the underlying dispute between parties to find federal subject matter
jurisdiction. 120 The narrow view, followed by the Second Circuit, requires
the face of the arbitration petition to state the reason for jurisdiction. 121
After looking to both the text of section 4 and analyzing the two
112. Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 612.
113. Vaden II, 489 F.3d 594, 597 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1651 (2008).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Vaden I, 396 F.3d at 367 ("[W]e do hold that when a party comes to federal
court seeking to compel arbitration, the presence of a federal question in the underlying
dispute is sufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction."); Ruling on Federal-Question
Jurisdiction Opens Federal Courts to FAA § 4 Motions, Disp. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2005, at
4, 4 [hereinafter Ruling on Federal-Question] ("[T]he 4th Circuit has ruled on the issue,
siding with the 1 th Circuit and offering a reasoned decision that expressly rejects [the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit].").
117. VadenI, 396 F.3d at 368.
118. Id.
119. 177 F.3d 1212, 1223 n.11 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that "it is appropriate for us to
'look through' Tamiami's arbitration request at the underlying licensing dispute in order to
determine whether Tamiami's complaint states a federal question").
120. Vaden I, 396 F.3d at 369.




approaches, the Vaden I court followed the broad approach set forth in
Tamiami IlL. 122
a. Vaden I Textual Analysis
In its textual analysis of section 4, the Vaden I court evaluated three
elements of the statute's plain language. 123 First, the court looked to the
phrase "save for such agreement" in section 4.124 The court interpreted this
phrase to mean that a court should find jurisdiction as if the claim to compel
arbitration never existed. 125 Second, the court found Congress's broad
reference to "Title 28" within the text of section 4 to mean that district
courts could hear any case wherein the district court has jurisdiction over
the underlying suit. 126 As a final textual justification, the court looked to
the phrase "controversy between the parties" and interpreted this as a
reference to the general controversy, rather than the specific arbitration
petition. 127
b. Vaden I Narrow View Analysis
Vaden I then turned to an analysis of the narrow view on this issue. 128
The Vaden I court had two reasons for not following the narrow view.
First, the court rejected the notion that looking to the underlying dispute
does not conform to the well-pleaded complaint rule.' 29 Rather, the court
pointed to the Declaratory Judgment Act, an act that allows federal courts to
look to the "real controversy" between parties in a declaratory judgment
action to realize jurisdiction. 130  Vaden I reasoned that the Declaratory
Judgment Act shows that courts interpret the well-pleaded complaint rule
122. Id. at 369. The court further clarified, however:
To be clear, we do not imply that arbitration agreements should receive
preferential treatment. No doors to federal court are open to those claims that are
closed to others. We agree that in passing the FAA Congress did not intend to
create federal jurisdiction .... We thus decline to eliminate § 1331 as a possible
basis for federal jurisdiction over a petition to compel arbitration under § 4 of the
FAA.
Id. at 372-73 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
n.32 (1983)). See generally Linda M. Lasley et al., Recent Developments in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 123, 145 (2006).
123. See Szalai, supra note 1, at 328-29.
124. Id.; see also Ruling on Federal-Question, supra note 116, at 4.
125. Szalai, supra note 1, at 328-29.
126. Vaden I, 396 F.3d at 370; see also Ruling on Federal-Question, supra note 116, at 4.
127. See Vaden I, 396 F.3d at 370 ("This common understanding of the word
'controversy' must govern our interpretation unless Congress chooses to narrow the term.
The text of § 4 requires us to consider jurisdiction as it arises out of the whole controversy
between the parties. This necessarily entails looking beyond the arbitration petition alone.");
see also Ruling on Federal-Question, note 116, at 4-5.
128. See generally infra Part lI.B. I (discussing the narrow view).
129. Vaden I,396 F.3d at 371.
130. Id.; see also Szalai, supra note 1, at 329; supra note 110 (reproducing the
Declaratory Judgment Act's text).
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too rigidly. 131 Second, the court pointed to the fact that following the
narrow view results in a severely restricted federal jurisdiction analysis.132
The court expressed concern that to hold otherwise only allows arbitration
claims in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, and this limiting
circumstance goes against the "'congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."' ' 133
c. Vaden I Consideration of Precedent
Additionally, the Vaden I court analyzed Fourth Circuit precedent in
Gibraltar, P.R., Inc. v. Otoki Group, Inc. 134 to support its conclusion that
the court should analyze the underlying cause of action. 135 In Gibraltar, the
court examined the underlying cause of action between the parties before
determining if jurisdiction existed. 136 The Vaden I court found this relevant
because, if the court decided to adopt the narrow view, it would allow for
the opposite reasoning than that established through Gibraltar's
precedent.137
d. The Fourth Circuit's Reaffirmation of Vaden I
On remand from Vaden I, the district court considered whether a federal
question actually existed in the underlying claim.' 38 After finding that a
federal question did exist, the district court denied Vaden's motion to
dismiss. 139 Vaden appealed, and in 2007 the Fourth Circuit again heard
Discover Bank v. Vaden (Vaden 1). In Vaden 11, the court analyzed both
whether a federal question existed and whether the district court's holding
compelling arbitration was proper. 140  Affirming the district court's
decision, the Vaden II court again analyzed whether section 4 of the FAA
provided federal courts with jurisdiction.14 1 Vaden II, in accord with Vaden
I, held that the well-pleaded complaint rule did not apply and that the court
131. See Vaden I, 396 F.3d at 371. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
noted that courts adopting the opposing approach were "moved by an understandable
allegiance to the well-pleaded complaint rule." Id. The court continued, "These cases rightly
point out that, '[t]he usual rules for determining federal question jurisdiction provide that a
complaint will not avail a basis of jurisdiction in so far as it goes beyond a statement of the
plaintiffs cause of action and anticipates or replies to a probable defense."' Id. (quoting
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981, 988 (5th Cir. 1992)).
132. Id. at 372.
133. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)).
134. 104 F.3d 616 (4th Cir. 1997).
135. Vaden 1, 396 F.3d at 373.
136. Gibraltar, 104 F.3d at 618.
137. Vaden I, 396 F.3d at 373.
138. Discover Bank v. Vaden, 409 F. Supp. 2d 632, 634 (D. Md. 2006).
139. Id. at 639.




could "look through" to the underlying claim. 142 The Vaden II court
reached this conclusion by looking to the plain language of section 4: "the
court would otherwise 'have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action...
of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the
parties."1 43 The court cited Vaden I and the Eleventh Circuit case Tamiami
III as support for embracing this broad approach. 144
3. Legal Commentary in Agreement with This Approach
This section summarizes legal analysis by Imre S. Szalai of California
Western School of Law. 145  Like the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits,
Professor Szalai concludes that the judiciary should look through to a
party's underlying claim when determining subject matter jurisdiction. 146
To find specific support for his position, Szalai first analyzes the case law
and then looks to numerous elements of the debate, including: (1) a textual
analysis, (2) the legislative history of the FAA, (3) the principle that federal
statutory claims are arbitrable, (4) the inconsistency of the "narrow"
approach, (5) the consistency between the Vaden I court's approach and the
well-pleaded complaint rule, and (6) the relationship between the FAA and
other contemporaneously enacted litigation. 147
First, Szalai states that, since being decided in 2005, Vaden I became "the
leading opinion regarding this broad view of jurisdiction and § 4 of the
FAA."' 48 He agrees with Vaden I that the "save for" clause addresses
federal courts' limited jurisdiction.149  Szalai further supports this
contention by pointing to a New York arbitration statute enacted in 1920,
five years before the FAA was enacted. 150 Szalai surmises that Congress
142. Id. at 607. In dissent, Judge Joseph R. Goodwin disagreed with the majority's
approach, specifically noting that "'[o]ne of the keystones of this limiting construction [of
section 1331] is the 'well-pleaded complaint rule' articulated by the Supreme Court in
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley and constantly reaffirmed by the federal judiciary."'
Id. at 609 (Goodwin, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller, supra note 49, at 1782).
143. Id. at 598 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)). In dissent, Judge Goodwin disagreed with
this procedural posture. He noted, "My disagreement with the majority opinion centers on
its finding of 'arising under' jurisdiction in a counterclaim. Federal question jurisdiction
cannot be predicated on federal issues that may arise later in an action by way of defense or
counterclaim." Id. at 609.
144. Id. at 599.
145. See generally Szalai, supra note 1.
146. Id. at 325.
147. See generally Szalai, supra note 1. Professor Imre S. Szalai argues that
[o]pponents of arbitration, particularly those who oppose the arbitrability of
statutory claims, may tend to gravitate to a restrictive view of jurisdiction that
limits the opportunities for enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal court.
In contrast, proponents of arbitration would seem to prefer a broader view of
jurisdiction, providing for enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal court in
a wider range of circumstances.
Id. at 324.
148. Id. at 329.
149. Id. at 338.
150. Id. at 337-38.
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could have replicated the New York statute in the FAA if it wanted the
same jurisdictional outcome. 5 1 Szalai notes,
Under the New York statute, an aggrieved party may petition the
"supreme court, or a judge thereof," whereas under the FAA, the
aggrieved party may petition "any court of the United States which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction .. " Why does this "save
for" clause appear in the federal statute but not the New York statute?
The difference in language likely arises from the difference between
jurisdiction in state courts and federal courts. 152
In other words, Szalai concludes, the state statute did not require the
"save for" clause because such language was superfluous. 153
Szalai's analysis of the textual language also points to the phrase
"controversy between the parties" of section 4. He argues that the Supreme
Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp. 15 4 already determined that this phrase refers to the underlying dispute
between the parties. 155 Szalai further notes that Moses H, Cone recognized
that federal jurisdiction over an arbitration claim arises when the court
already has jurisdiction over the underlying claim between parties. 156
Szalai concludes his textual analysis by arguing, like the court in Vaden
I, that the general reference to Title 28 includes federal question
jurisdiction, and that this supports a broad view of section 4 because
Congress did not point specifically to either section 1332 (diversity
jurisdiction) or section 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) as the elements
that would allow a federal court to recognize jurisdiction. 157
Szalai's analysis of the legislative history of the FAA specifically
references the 1954 amendments that changed the text of section 4 to "Title
28" from "judicial code."'158 While making these updates, Szalai argues,
Congress deliberately decided to incorporate all of Title 28 rather than
specifying diversity jurisdiction as the reason to find subject matter
jurisdiction.159 Therefore, Szalai argues,
There was no indication that the 1954 change in terms from "judicial
code" to "Title 28" would significantly alter the applicability or meaning
of the FAA, which suggests that Congress at the time of the 1954
amendments believed that § 4 of the FAA ... must have already covered
151. Id. at 342.
152. Id. at 338 (quoting The United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 4, 43 Stat. 883
(1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000))).
153. Id. at 340.
154. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
155. See Szalai, supra note 1, at 344.
156. See id. at 347 ("To conclude, the term 'the controversy between the parties' in § 4
refers to the underlying dispute to be arbitrated, and, as recognized by the Supreme Court in
Moses H. Cone, jurisdiction to compel arbitration pursuant to § 4 exists when the district
court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute to be arbitrated.").
157. Id. at 352.
158. Id. at 356.
159. Id. at 357.
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federal question jurisdiction with its broad reference to the judicial
code. 160
Szalai also argues that the Vaden I court's broad approach more
accurately reflects both congressional and Supreme Court support of
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 161 Szalai connects the desire
to support arbitration claims with a sound reason to use the Vaden I
approach since it expands opportunities for enforcement. 162
Additionally, Szalai favors interpreting section 4 broadly because the
narrow approach leads to conflicting results. 163 Szalai hypothesizes that, if
a party does not comply with an arbitration agreement and brings an action
in federal court based on the underlying federal question in dispute, the
other party to the action could bring a counterclaim (in federal court) to
compel arbitration. 164 In contrast, if the same second party brought the
arbitration claim, and the first party had not brought the original suit, the
second party's claim would be brought in state court since it does not
present a federal question. 165 In other words, Szalai prefers the Vaden I
approach because "federal courts consider the underlying dispute to be
arbitrated in assessing jurisdiction, regardless of the purported basis for
jurisdiction, which seems to be a more inherently consistent approach."' 166
Szalai also argues that the Vaden I broad approach does not conflict with
the well-pleaded complaint rule.167 Szalai agrees with the Vaden I court's
analysis that "the well-pleaded complaint rule is not as 'rigid' as the
[narrow view] line of cases portrays it to be."'168 Szalai also analogizes
section 4 to the Declaratory Judgment Act, an act providing that courts
should consider the underlying claim when analyzing jurisdiction: "Just as
the well-pleaded complaint rule has been flexibly applied in connection
with declaratory judgment actions, examining the underlying controversy to
be arbitrated in order to determine whether jurisdiction exists over a petition
to compel arbitration is consistent with the well-pleaded complaint rule."'169
Finally, Szalai looks to legislation enacted contemporaneously to the
FAA to determine congressional intent. Szalai focuses on the Judiciary Act
of 1925, which, like the FAA, arose from a congressional desire to relieve
an overburdened court system.170 In his comparison, Szalai concludes that
160. Id.
161. See id. at 358 ("[T]he Supreme Court has since emphatically rejected its earlier cases
treating federal statutory claims as non-arbitrable, and it is now well established that the
FAA generally embraces federal statutory claims as arbitrable.").
162. See id. at 359.
163. See id. at 361.
164. See id. at 360-62.
165. See id. at 360.
166. Id. at 364.
167. Id. at 364-65.
168. Id. at 365 (quoting Vaden 1, 396 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2005)).
169. Id. at 368.
170. See id. at 369 ("At the time these acts were passed, a docket crisis existed in the
federal judiciary ....").
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"[t]his relationship.., does not conclusively prove whether the Vaden or
[narrow] approach is correct, but the broad Vaden view is arguably more
consistent with the overall legislative efforts to deal with the overburdened
judiciary than the narrow ... view." 17 1
B. The Second and Seventh Circuits'Approach: Bound by the Well-
Pleaded Complaint Rule
Part II.B addresses the other side of this debate. The Second and Seventh
Circuits have both ruled that a party may not establish federal subject
matter jurisdiction by "looking through" to the underlying dispute between
the parties. Rather, these circuits require the claim to compel arbitration to
state the reason for subject matter jurisdiction on its face. In other words,
the complaint, according to these courts, must meet the well-pleaded
complaint rule standard. Part II.B.1 looks to the Second Circuit's holding
in Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay.172 Part II.B.2 analyzes the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation.173 Part II.B.3
analyzes other circuits that appear to be in accord with the Second and
Seventh Circuits. Finally, Part II.B.4 examines Judge Stanley Marcus's
concurrence in Community State Bank v. Strong,174 which argues that the
Eleventh Circuit should not look to the underlying claim to establish
jurisdiction. Community State Bank, as noted in Part II.A.1, was recently
vacated and will be reheard en banc by the Eleventh Circuit. 175
1. Second Circuit: Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay
The Second Circuit in Westmoreland looked to the face of the claim to
compel arbitration to determine if federal question jurisdiction existed on
the section 4 claim. 176  Westmoreland arose following the failure of
monetary investments made by George D. Findlay and John F. Joyce. 177
Findlay and Joyce invested in a limited partnership of the Jaysons, the
owners of Westmoreland, a financial planning and counseling
corporation. 178 Findlay and Joyce received their financial advice from
Terry King, an employee of the Jaysons'.179 Findlay and Joyce lost
essentially all of their investment after the stock they purchased proved to
be valueless, and repayments of their loans were refused.180
171. Id. at 372.
172. 100 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 1996).
173. 463 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2006).
174. 485 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2007).
175. Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 508 F.3d 576 (1 1th Cir. 2007).
176. Westmoreland, 100 F.3d at 269.
177. Id. at 264-65.
178. Id. at 264.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 264-65.
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After losing their investment, Findlay and Joyce initiated arbitration
proceedings. 181 Westmoreland brought suit in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of New York, claiming that, under the three-year
statute of limitations, the arbitration claim was time-barred. 182 Findlay and
Joyce brought a counterclaim, alleging that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over Westmoreland's suit, and sought to compel arbitration.' 8 3
The district court dismissed Westmoreland's suit on two alternative
grounds. First, the court dismissed for lack of federal subject matter
jurisdiction. Second, the court stated that, even with subject matter
jurisdiction, it would still dismiss the claim to compel arbitration.' 84
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court on two grounds.
First, the court said that, despite the textual language of section 4, the
statute does not allow the court to look through the arbitration petition to
find jurisdiction.'8 5  Second, the court stated that the complaint must
comport with the well-pleaded complaint rule, which it failed to do in this
case. 186 The complaint did not comport with the well-pleaded complaint
rule because it only "anticipate[d] that respondents' answer would argue
that their arbitration claims are meritorious under [federal law].'"187
a. Textual Language Analysis
In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit turned to the textual
language of section 4. Initially, the court conceded that the language
appears to confer jurisdiction in federal court based on the underlying
claim, but did not find this conclusive after looking to Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc. v. Valenzuela Bock,188 a case decided by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York. 189 The Westmoreland court
explained that Valenzuela Bock analyzed the history of the FAA and
Congress's intent behind its enactment before holding that the Act intended
to eliminate the common law's rejection of arbitration petitions.190 Further,
the Second Circuit noted that, if federal jurisdiction is established because
of diversity of citizenship or an admiralty claim, the court is not divested of
181. Id. at 265.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 266.
185. See id. at 267.
186. Id. at 268.
187. Id. at 269.
188. 696 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
189. See Westmoreland, 100 F.3d at 267 ("We are persuaded by Judge [Pierre] Leval's
opinion in Valenzuela Bock, which found, in a case in which the underlying claims were
based on federal securities laws, that the text of § 4 does not confer federal question
jurisdiction 'where the claim of federal jurisdiction is not based on the petition itself, but
rather on the federal character of the underlying dispute [in arbitration]."' (quoting
Valenzuela Bock, 969 F. Supp. at 965)); see also Szalai, supra note 1, at 331 ("The
Westmoreland court relied heavily on the reasoning of a district court opinion, Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Valenzuela Bock.").
190. Westmoreland, 100 F.3d at 267-68.
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jurisdiction under a claim to compel arbitration because it does not fall
under either option.191 Lastly, the court's textual analysis turned to the
FAA's reference to "United States court" and interpreted this phrase to
mean that the Act does not confer federal jurisdiction. 192 Acknowledging
that other courts interpret this phrase in just the opposite way, the
Westmoreland court again referenced Valenzuela Bock. In accord with that
case, the Second Circuit stated that it "would produce an odd distinction" if
the court conferred federal jurisdiction with section 4 claims, since petitions
regarding arbitral awards under sections 9 and 10 of the FAA are not
allowed in federal court, except by way of diversity jurisdiction or an
admiralty claim. 193
b. Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Analysis
The Westmoreland court also addressed the petitioners' claim that section
4 amounts to a reversal of the well-pleaded complaint rule. 194 In response,
the Second Circuit noted that the well-pleaded complaint rule was well-
established at the time of the FAA's enactment. 195 Therefore, the court
explained, if Congress intended to rescind the well-pleaded complaint rule
under the FAA, it would have done so explicitly. 196 The Westmoreland
court reiterated that Congress intended to quell judicial hostility through the
Act, not to change the purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule. 197
Following the above analysis regarding section 4, the court concluded
that jurisdiction was lacking because the petitioner's complaint did not state
a basis for subject matter jurisdiction on its face. 198
2. Seventh Circuit: Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation
In Ho-Chunk, the Seventh Circuit, in accord with the Second Circuit, did
not look to the underlying complaint to establish federal jurisdiction under a
section 4 claim. 199 The Ho-Chunk court addressed a petition to compel
arbitration between the State of Wisconsin and Ho-Chunk Nation (Ho-
Chunk), a Native American tribe, for breach of a gaming compact. 200 The
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, finding that
federal jurisdiction existed, appointed an arbitrator to the dispute. 201 Ho-
Chunk appealed the order appointing an arbitrator, claiming that the district
191. See id. at 268.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 268-69; see also Szalai, supra note 1, at 333.
195. See Westmoreland, 100 F.3d at 268 (noting that at the time the Act was enacted, the
well-pleaded complaint rule had already been established for thirty-seven years).
196. See id.
197. See id. at 269.
198. Id. at 269-70.
199. See Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 463 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2006).




court lacked jurisdiction and that Wisconsin did not state a cause of
action. 202
In addressing the allegation that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, the court explained that the plaintiffs claim to compel
arbitration must state the reason for federal jurisdiction in accord with the
well-pleaded complaint rule.203 To establish federal jurisdiction, the court
continued, federal law "must 'create[] the cause of action,"' and here, the
only cause of action that governed Wisconsin's complaint was to compel
arbitration. 204
Rather than finding federal jurisdiction by analyzing the underlying
complaint between the parties, the court looked to Minor v. Prudential
Securities, Inc.,205 a prior Seventh Circuit decision. In Minor, the court
stated that "[a] strong body of caselaw has developed ... holding that the
nature of the underlying dispute [in arbitration] is irrelevant for purposes of
subject matter jurisdiction, even on a motion to compel [arbitration] under
section 4, i.e., the motion itself must invoke diversity or federal question
jurisdiction." 20 6 Therefore, under Ho-Chunk, the Seventh Circuit does not
look to the underlying complaint between the parties in an arbitration
petition, but instead only considers the face of the plaintiffs complaint to
determine jurisdiction.20 7
The court then looked to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) to
see if reference to it in the plaintiffs complaint to compel arbitration
provided a basis for federal jurisdiction.208 The court found that IGRA did
not contain a federal question and reiterated that the Seventh Circuit does
not "look through to the underlying complaint in arbitration to ascertain
whether subject matter jurisdiction obtains. 209
Wisconsin argued that the arbitration clause in the compact specifically
stated that arbitration issues would be raised in federal court in the Western
District of Wisconsin. 210 Despite this contractual stipulation, the court
concluded that "neither the parties nor their lawyers may stipulate to
jurisdiction or waive arguments that the court lacks jurisdiction. '211
Following consideration of the well-pleaded complaint rule requirement,
the Seventh Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist and
therefore vacated the district court's holding and remanded for the district
court to dismiss.212
202. See id.
203. See id. at 659.
204. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850-51 (1985)).
205. 94 F.3d 1103 (7th Cir. 1996).
206. Id. at 1106.
207. See Ho-Chunk, 463 F.3d at 659.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 660.
210. See id. at 661.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 662.
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3. Other Circuits in Accord
Part II.B.3 looks to a number of other circuits that agree with the Second
and Seventh Circuits on their section 4 jurisdictional analysis. In other
words, these circuits appear to conclude that the underlying dispute between
parties cannot form the basis for subject matter jurisdiction in a complaint
to compel arbitration.
a. The U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit concluded in Fox v. Faust that federal jurisdiction does
not exist unless the complaint shows federal jurisdiction "on the face. '213
Additionally, in Virgin Islands Housing Authority v. Coastal General
Construction Services Corp., the Third Circuit found that federal
jurisdiction cannot compel arbitration unless "federal law creates the cause
of action" or "the complaint poses a substantial federal question. '214
Therefore, the Third Circuit comports with the conclusion that the face of
the complaint must state the federal cause of action in a petition to compel
arbitration.
b. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit in Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver215 is also in accord with
this side of the debate. In Smith Barney, the court held that the "federal
nature of the underlying claims that were submitted to arbitration" does not
supply an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.216 In other words, the
court did not look through to the underlying issue between the parties to
establish jurisdiction, but instead required the arbitration claim to contain an
independent jurisdictional basis.
c. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Although the Ninth Circuit has not made a definitive holding on this
issue,217 it will likely follow these other circuits. Carter v. Health Net of
California, Inc.218 evidences the Ninth Circuit's view. In Carter, the Ninth
Circuit determined that "a petition to compel arbitration because the dispute
falls within the scope of an arbitration clause, or to vacate an award because
the arbitrators exceeded their powers under that clause, will turn on the
interpretation of the clause, regardless of whether the actual dispute
213. Fox v. Faust, No. 05-1998, 2007 WL 1454291, at *2 (3d Cir. May 18, 2007).
214. V.I. Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 916 (3d Cir.
1994).
215. 108 F.3d 92 (6th Cir. 1997).
216. Id. at 94.
217. See In re Cintas Corp. Overtime Pay Arbitration Litig., No. M:06-cv-01781-SBA,
2007 WL 1302496, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2007) (stating that "[t]he Ninth Circuit has not
yet squarely ruled on this question").
218. 374 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2004).
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implicates any federal laws."' 219 Carter's language implies that, if the Ninth
Circuit does rule on this issue, the court will not look to "whether the actual
dispute implicates any federal laws," but instead will require the face of the
complaint to provide for federal jurisdiction.220
4. Community State Bank's Concurrence
Judge Marcus, in a concurrence, argued strongly against the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of section 4 in Community State Bank.221 Judge
Marcus's concurrence constitutes a comprehensive argument stating that the
court should reconsider its precedent. Judge Marcus argued that
Community State Bank's reasoning was erroneous and that the question
posed was "ripe for en banc review by this Court or certiorari review by the
Supreme Court. '222 Since handing down Community State Bank in April
2007, the Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and vacated the
ruling on September 10, 2007. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit could
possibly change its current precedent on this issue after reconsideration.
Judge Marcus's concurrence in Community State Bank focused on the
reasons why he believed the court should have reversed its precedent on the
issue.
Judge Marcus asserted that reconsideration of the issue was of particular
importance for two reasons. First, the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning goes
against that of numerous other circuits. 223  Second, looking to the
underlying claim unnecessarily expands the jurisdiction of federal courts.224
Judge Marcus's argument regarding reconsideration of section 4 revolved
around three issues: (1) that the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation conflicts
with the well-pleaded complaint rule; (2) that the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation conflicts with the circuit's own precedent; and (3) that the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation contravenes the FAA's purpose, which
219. Id. at 836 (quoting Greenberg v. Bear, Steams & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir.
2000)).
220. Id. (quoting Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 26).
221. 485 F.3d 597, 614 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (Marcus, J., concurring). Judge Stanley Marcus
concurred with the majority, rather than dissenting, because he believed the court was bound
by the precedent set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Tamiami
IlI. Further, Judge Marcus noted that he did not disagree with the outcome of the case
because he believed it raised a federal question. Id. at 613-15. See generally Posting of
Richard Bales to Workplace Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/
2007/04/jurisdiction_ov.html (April 27, 2007) (noting that, although the Eleventh Circuit
followed prior precedent, two judges "grudgingly followed the precedent, but argued that
precedent was wrong").
222. Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 614-15 (Marcus, J., concurring).
223. See id. at 615 (noting that Tamiami llrs stance puts the Eleventh Circuit "squarely at
odds with at least four of our sister circuits, and aligns us with just one other circuit," and
then listing precedents in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits that have taken the opposing approach); supra Parts II.B. 1-3.
224. Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 614-15 (Marcus, J., concurring) (arguing that, when
Tamiami III was decided by the Eleventh Circuit, there were numerous federal issues that
may have resulted in the court deciding too hastily on the interpretation of section 4 since the
issue "considerably expands federal court jurisdiction").
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requires submitting the dispute to arbitration, not the courts, and making the
dispute "an ordinary contract action. '225
a. Conflict with the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Judge Marcus argued that the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on Tamiami III
conflicts with the well-pleaded complaint rule. He pointed to the long
history of the well-pleaded complaint rule and that it requires the face of a
petitioner's complaint to provide a reason for jurisdiction.226 In Community
State Bank, Judge Marcus did not see anything in the petitioner's complaint
to trigger federal jurisdiction and specifically mentioned that arbitration
petitions are contract claims.227 He also noted that the only allegations of a
federal nature in the complaint are superfluous. 228
Looking to the contract claim issue, Judge Marcus argued that the court
should view arbitration petitions as ordinary contract claims because "the
right to compel arbitration is based on the parties' agreement to arbitrate,
the district court ... is limited to interpreting that agreement and may not
adjudicate the substantive dispute." 229
Addressing the possible federal claim issue, Judge Marcus analyzed the
petitioner's defense that referenced section 27 of the Federal Depository
Insurance Act.230 However, Judge Marcus argued that this reference to
section 27 was inadequate to find a federal question because the well-
pleaded complaint rule does not permit the establishment of federal
jurisdiction by anticipating a defense. 231
b. Tension Regarding Section 4 's Interpretation in the Circuit Courts
Judge Marcus pointed to the tension between the court's reliance on
Tamiami III and case law inside and outside of the Eleventh Circuit.232
Judge Marcus referenced Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour, Guthrie, &
Co.233 as an example of a sister circuit concluding that the court should not
look through to the underlying dispute between the parties to establish
jurisdiction.234 He asserted that the court should consider the example of
225. Id. ("[T]he § 4 FAA petitioner's very purpose in going to federal district court is to
have an arbitrator, rather than any court, resolve the underlying dispute to be
arbitrated .... ").
226. See id.
227. See id. at 617.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 618. Further, Judge Marcus referred to the Supreme Court's holding in Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967), which
determined that the arbitration clause may be separated from the main contract between
parties. Therefore, any claim referencing the validity of the contract is not for the court to
decide, but rather an issue for the arbitrator. See id. at 618, 622.
230. See id. at 621.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 622-23.
233. 577 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1978).
234. Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 623 (Marcus, J., concurring).
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Commercial Metals because the decision "sensibly suggests that the
appropriate dispute to which we ought to apply the well-pleaded complaint
rule is the dispute to be resolved by the district court, not the dispute which
will eventually be resolved by the arbitrator."235 Since resolution of the
motion to compel arbitration did not alter the underlying issue between the
parties, Judge Marcus concluded that the underlying dispute should not
have factored into the court's determination of appropriate jurisdiction.236
Judge Marcus then pointed to a holding within the Eleventh Circuit,
Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp.,237 in which the court analyzed a claim
concerning sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.238 The Baltin court's analysis
concluded that federal jurisdiction did not exist because the well-pleaded
complaint rule requires the cause of action to rest in federal law or its
resolution to rely on federal law.239
Looking to both Baltin and Commercial Metals, Judge Marcus agreed
with what those opinions suggested-that the well-pleaded complaint rule
should apply to the complaint before the court in a section 4 claim, not to
the underlying dispute.240
Judge Marcus then looked to the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on Vaden I
in reaching the conclusion that the court could look through to the
underlying claim.241 In Vaden I, the Fourth Circuit concluded that, when
drafting section 4, Congress could have limited "Title 28" to refer only to
diversity jurisdiction, but chose not to, and therefore a broader
interpretation follows congressional intent.242 Judge Marcus did not find
this position compelling, asserting that the reference in section 4 to Title 28
could not logically be limited by Congress to diversity jurisdiction, since
federal jurisdiction also includes admiralty jurisdiction and supplemental
jurisdiction over counterclaims. 243
c. The FAA's Purpose
Judge Marcus also disapproved of the Fourth Circuit's analysis that the
current Supreme Court policy to enforce arbitration agreements means that
federal courts should favor finding subject matter jurisdiction when section
4 claims are presented. 244 In criticizing this rationale, Judge Marcus argued
235. Id. Judge Marcus later noted that "[tihe FAA was designed to 'make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so."' Id. at 628 (quoting Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967)).
236. Id. at 623-34.
237. 128 F.3d 1466 (1 th Cir. 1997).
238. Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 624 (Marcus, J., concurring). Sections 10 and 11 of
the FAA provide the grounds for modifying or vacating an arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C.
§§ 10-11 (2000).
239. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11.
240. See Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 625 (Marcus, J., concurring).
241. Id.
242. See id. at 626-27.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 628.
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that it goes against the purpose of the FAA and the intent of the Supreme
Court.245 Judge Marcus asserted that, since federal courts are of limited
jurisdiction, it does not make sense to infer establishment of jurisdiction,
but rather only makes sense when Congress explicitly confers the right. 246
Judge Marcus asserted that the Eleventh Circuit should consider section 4
petitions like they do any other contract and that Congress did not "intend
to 'elevate [arbitration agreements] over other forms of contract.'" 2 47
Judge Marcus emphasized that what arbitration petitions really hope to
achieve is enforcement of an arbitration agreement, not resolution of the
claim to be arbitrated. 248 Therefore, Judge Marcus argued, "it is important
to recognize that the denial of a federal forum in such a case is no tragedy,
for in these situations no one has asked a federal court to resolve the 'real
controversy between the parties."'' 249 In sum, a federal court does not need
to enforce an "ordinary contract" dispute or address the underlying claim to
be arbitrated. 250
d. Resolution Considerations
To resolve this dispute between the circuits, Judge Marcus recommended
against adoption of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the statute.251
Judge Marcus recommended redrafting the pertinent part of section 4 to
read: "[a] party seeking to compel arbitration may petition any district
court which, notwithstanding the prior common law rule that prevented
courts from specifically enforcing arbitration agreements, is otherwise
vested of subject matter jurisdiction over the suit before the court." 252 By
interpreting the "save for" clause to mean that jurisdiction only vests based
on the arbitration petition, Judge Marcus argued that the congressional
purpose of the FAA is met. 253 Thus, if Congress intended to reverse prior
hostility by enacting the FAA, the statute still enables any court to compel
arbitration agreements.254
Turning to the "controversy between the parties" language of section 4,
Judge Marcus indicated that the court should read this phrase as a
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 629 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
404 n.12 (1967)). But see Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that
arbitration agreements are more than contracts: "the Court approves a rule which is...
contrary to the intention of the parties and to accepted principles of contract law-a rule
which indeed elevates arbitration provisions above all other contractual provisions").
248. See Cmty. State Bank, 485 F.3d at 629-30 (Marcus, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 630.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 630-34.
252. Id. at 633.
253. Id. at 631 (noting that the FAA was enacted, according to the Supreme Court, to
"'ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate' by 'overrul[ing] the
judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate' (alteration in original)
(quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985))).
254. See id. at 632.
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requirement to look to the actual arbitration petition before the court.2 5 5
Additionally, by following the Tamiami III approach in analyzing section 4
claims, Judge Marcus noted that the court frequently addresses the
underlying claim to determine if federal jurisdiction exists.256 Doing so
goes against the very purpose of having an arbitrator decide the dispute
between parties. Judge Marcus pointed to the fact that since FAA
petitioners cannot bring their underlying claim to court for adjudication, the
court should not pass on the underlying issue for arbitration in any way. 257
Judge Marcus concluded by reiterating that the Eleventh Circuit should
carefully reconsider its precedent.25 8 He asserted that the "short footnote"
in Tamiami III does not amount to sufficient consideration of the issue to
bind the circuit when other courts have given it far greater consideration. 259
III. FOLLOWING A NARROW READING OF THE WELL-PLEADED
COMPLAINT RULE
Part II of this Note reviewed the current circuit split on the issue of how
courts establish federal jurisdiction over section 4 claims to compel
arbitration. The decisions reviewed in this Note interpret section 4 by either
looking through to the underlying complaint between the parties or
requiring the face of the complaint to state the reason for jurisdiction. This
Note also considered applicable commentary in the legal community.
Part III advocates for resolution of this conflict through a narrow reading
of the well-pleaded complaint rule, a rule that requires a complaint to
establish federal jurisdiction on its face, not through the underlying claim.
Part III.A argues that section 4 petitions are meant to resolve contractual
disputes and therefore do not provide a persuasive reason for a court to
establish federal jurisdiction. Part III.B maintains that the original intent of
the legislature provides persuasive evidence that courts must still comply
with the well-pleaded complaint rule on section 4 claims. Part III.C
advocates that revision of the FAA by Congress may most effectively
clarify the meaning of section 4 and other disputed sections of the FAA.
255. See id. at 632-33 (clarifying that suits brought as "embedded" claims are generally
found to have jurisdiction over the claim to compel arbitration).
256. See id. at 616-17. On this point, Judge Marcus noted,
As we noted in the majority opinion, determining whether Strong's claims-to-be-
arbitrated arise under federal law would require us to provide some answer to the
very legal and factual questions that form the parties' underlying dispute-a
dispute which, under the clear policy of the FAA, is for an arbitrator to resolve.
Id. at 634.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 635.
259. See id. at 635 n.17 (explaining further that the same footnote allowing the Eleventh
Circuit to look to the underlying dispute between parties also enabled the court to do the
same with a section 9 petition, and further stating that the language of section 4 cannot be
applied to section 9).
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A. Contract Enforcement as the Purpose Behind a Suit to Compel
Arbitration
Judge Marcus convincingly argued in his concurrence to Community
State Bank that a court should consider a suit to compel arbitration as a
matter separate from the underlying dispute. 260 Further, Judge Marcus
emphasized that courts unnecessarily look to the underlying claim between
parties when only a breach of contract claim requires resolution. 261 In
accord with Judge Marcus's argument, this Note advocates for a resolution
to this debate recognizing that arbitration petitions lie in contract law
enforcement. State courts are equipped to resolve contract claims, and the
policy to resist expansion of federal jurisdiction is best served by not
elevating enforcement of arbitration agreements above contract claims.262
In this legal debate, only two circuits-the Fourth and Eleventh-have
allowed the court to look through to the underlying claim to establish
jurisdiction. The upcoming rehearing en banc of Community State Bank
may result in a reconsideration of the Eleventh Circuit's precedent,
especially since the majority of circuits ruled the other way on this issue.263
Creating an exception to the general rule that federal courts are of limited
jurisdiction by allowing parties to bring section 4 petitions (that amount to
state breach of contract claims) to federal court undermines the very
limitation under which these courts operate. 264
Furthermore, a court analyzing an underlying claim when considering the
appropriate jurisdiction may end up positing an analysis on that underlying
claim in the process of establishing jurisdiction. In this way, a court may
end up making a determination and passing judgment, implicitly or
explicitly, on the very dispute for the arbitrator to decide.2 65  Since
Congress intended for the FAA to empower and encourage courts to
enforce arbitration as a means of resolving disputes, the judiciary should
not address claims meant for the arbitrator. Rather, the court should only
address the dispute bringing the parties to the courtroom-enforcement of
the arbitration agreement. 266
Before enactment of the FAA, parties were uncertain whether their
contract could include an arbitration agreement. 267 Today, however, parties
may include arbitration clauses knowing they "are as effective and binding
as other types of contracts." 268  Furthermore, arbitration clauses are
generally agreed to be separate contracts from the main contract. 269 This
260. See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
264. See generally supra Part I.B. 1.
265. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
267. See BENNETT, supra note 15, at 59.
268. Id.
269. See supra note 229.
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means that, even if the main contract is void or invalid, the court will
uphold the agreement to arbitrate. 270 Parties bringing claims to compel
arbitration hope to enforce what the courts see as separate contractual
disputes. Therefore, interpretation of the arbitration agreement, as separate
from the main agreement between the parties, is the only issue the court
should consider. In the event that a court does not uphold an arbitration
agreement and the underlying dispute does address a federal question, the
parties can bring suit in the appropriate jurisdiction to resolve the
underlying cause of action in the new complaint.
Allowing courts to look through to the underlying claim conflicts with
the longstanding rule that federal courts are of limited jurisdiction.271 The
most reasonable interpretation of the FAA reinforces both the well-pleaded
complaint rule and the rule that federal courts are of limited jurisdiction.
The alternative unnecessarily expands the jurisdiction of federal courts and
gives too much weight to arbitration agreements. Arbitration claims need
not be heard in federal courts if state courts can effectively provide relief.
The end result, after all, is for the issue to be heard by an arbitrator.
Resolving the claim in state court without "looking through" to the
underlying claim allows the real dispute between parties to go to arbitration
for dispute resolution and award.
B. Consistency with Original Congressional Intent
Looking to the original intent of Congress, the FAA does not explicitly or
implicitly supplant the well-pleaded complaint rule. Rather, the House
report accompanying the Act points to "an anachronism of our American
law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for
their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to
arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their
jurisdiction. This jealousy... was adopted.., by the American courtS. ' 2 7 2
Given that the House report does not declare the Act to overturn the well-
pleaded complaint rule-a rule established through thirty-seven years of
Supreme Court precedent-and that Congress's stated intent was to abolish
judicial antagonism toward arbitration agreements, there is compelling
evidence that the Act intended to provide a remedy to parties seeking to
compel arbitration, and nothing more.273 In fact, some legal scholarship at
the time suggested that the newly enacted FAA simply provided a remedy
for parties wishing to enforce arbitration agreements. 274
An argument against this narrow view of determining jurisdiction under
the FAA is that the Supreme Court encourages enforcement of arbitration
agreements, and therefore federal courts should favor the establishment of
270. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
272. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 (1985) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)); see also Part I.C.1.
273. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 59.
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jurisdiction.275 Professor Szalai touts this theory by also pointing out that
federal courts should recognize jurisdiction in order to be consistent with
the Supreme Court's policy favoring arbitration.276 This Note does not find
this perspective compelling for two reasons: (1) state courts can resolve
arbitration petitions without expanding federal jurisdiction,277 and (2)
Congress enacted the FAA as a way to ensure that arbitration claims were
treated the same as other contract enforcement claims.27 8 After years of
animosity by the judiciary toward arbitration agreements, it makes sense
that the Court initially needed to provide an explicit declaration that these
claims should now be upheld. This declaration does not signify that
arbitration agreements deserve special treatment beyond ordinary contract
claims. Rather, the judiciary should consider these petitions alongside other
contract claims.
Furthermore, the potential increase in forum shopping if the court looks
to the underlying claim is an undesirable side effect given what the party
bringing the arbitration petition hopes to achieve-resolution by an
arbitrator, not a court.279 By enforcing arbitration agreements, the federal
courts can continue to uphold Congress's original goal of relieving an
overburdened judiciary through enforcement of alternative dispute
resolution methods. 280
C. Resolution Through Congressional Revision
Congressional revision of the Act may provide the most practical means
of resolving this disagreement over the interpretation of section 4 as well as
other interpretation issues arising under the FAA. Considering the
numerous ongoing differences among the circuits in interpreting the FAA,
revision by Congress to clarify the Act's provisions is overdue.2 81
Congress should not continue to leave the courts to debate the original
intent of section 4. The needs of today's parties engaged in arbitration are
different than those contemplated when Congress drafted the original Act.
Congress has the ability to reconsider these needs, rather than letting the
patchwork of judicial opinions fill in what the courts believe Congress
intended.2 82 Although the Supreme Court could at some unknown time in
the future resolve the conflict among the circuits, the solution more
immediately lies with a clear answer from Congress. 283
275. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 27.
279. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 5, 55 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 72 (noting suggested amendments to the FAA).
283. Foster, supra note 6 ("Under the circumstances, it would seem fitting for the U.S.
Supreme Court to grant petitions for writ of certiorari in cases that present opportunities to
resolve the issues dividing these courts. Yet there is only so much the court could do to




Section 4 of the FAA requires clarification because of the ubiquitous use
of arbitration agreements today. Application of the broad interpretation of
this dispute unnecessarily expands federal jurisdiction. When determining
whether to recognize jurisdiction, courts generally require the petitioner to
state the reason for jurisdiction on the face of their complaint. Despite the
Supreme Court's urging for the judiciary to enforce arbitration clauses,
there is no compelling reason for the FAA to carve out an exception to the
well-pleaded complaint rule. Section 4 petitions amount to contract
disputes and therefore can be resolved in state court; there is no sound
reason to expand the federal courts' limited jurisdiction. Therefore, the
narrow interpretation, as followed by the Second Circuit in Westmoreland
and the Seventh Circuit in Ho-Chunk, provides the best interpretation of
section 4 of the FAA.
Arbitration Act (FAA), a statute first enacted more than 80 years ago. Accordingly, the time
may be right for Congress to modernize the FAA and bring greater clarity and consistency to
arbitration law in the United States.").
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